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At the end of the book, the former Putin’s adviser for public relations urges 
Russia and the West to try to understand each other’s fears. However, the author 
considers that no other Russian leader in the future will be more willing, than the 
current president from Kremlin, to receive sermons or lessons from outside.  
Through this study, the author has analyzed some of the most thorny details 
of Russian policy, both domestically and especially in its external relations. This 
volume offers a thorough picture of the events that gravitated around Vladimir 
Putin, from his first term until his re-election – for the third time – to the Russian 
head of state in 2012. Many information used by the author were extracted from 
interviews held by officials of the first rank not only from Russia but also from 
USA, Germany, France, UK, Ukraine and Georgia, information that reveal details 
that have escaped over the time. The thorough analysis of sources, the personal 
experience as advisor for public relations and concise style of writing make us say 
that the volume of Angus Roxburgh is particularly important for the historiography 
about the period of the first two presidential terms in which Putin was the main 
architect of Russia's policy. 
Angus Roxburgh study attempted to highlight the stormy political life of 
the Kremlin, after the withdrawal from the power of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir 
Putin's accession to the highest office of the Russian state. Despite the fact that it is 
a book about Putin during his first two terms at the Kremlin, we believe that if 
correctly interpreted, this would provide alternatives for better cooperation with 
the current Kremlin leader. 
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By then in Russian, but also in numerous translations, the paper sparked 
controversy and a series of polemics, being widely publicized and discussed in the 
issues addressed by the author both by non-specialist readers and scientific or 
political world. Given that the volume is divided into 22 chapters, I preferred a 
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review of the whole, trying to highlight novel information provided by Stanislav 
Belkovsky and his vision about Vladimir Putin, as well as the objectives that the 
author wanted to achieve by publishing this books. 
One aspect that attracts attention is the title, The Corint Publishing House 
preferring a comercial title, “Putin: the prohibited biography”. The original book 
was titled “Putin: the man who wasn’t there” (СТАНИСЛАВ БЕЛКОВСКИЙ 
ПУТИН: ЧЕЛОВЕК, КОТОРОГО НЕ БЫЛО). Regarding the changing of the 
title, even Belkovsky gives us an explanation (which remains suspended since the 
publisher has given up the original version): the title is a modeled title of the 
American film “The Man Who Was’t There”, giving the impression that the 
biography of the Russian leader is addressed primarily to the Western society. 
Moreover, the author tries to show the similarities between the film’s hero and the 
Russian President: Hero’s sins of actual crimes have been forgiven, but he was 
sentenced for a crime he had no way committed. Something similar is the world 
public opinion trying to do with Putin (p. 17). 
One of the chapters of the volume, specifically the third one, The Legend 
about KGB: James Bond or the Tailor of Panama, discusses the past of 
Vladimir Putin in the KGB service, which Stanislav Belkovsky puts it in doubt. 
Thus, according to the author, the Russian president would not have worked with 
the General Direction no. 1 of KGB (foreign intelligence), but was assigned to the 
so-called General Direction no. 5 which was dealing with the fight against 
dissidence and political surveys, Putin’s main obligation being to report everything 
what the Soviet students who were in Dresden with scholarships talked about. One 
argument Belkovsky brings for this statement is that none famous employee of the 
Russian secret services received major appointments during President Putin’s three 
mandates. 
After appointing him adviser to the vice-rector of the State University of 
Leningrad (an appointment that was based on Putin’s mistake to disclose the 
names of fifteen intelligence agents of the Soviet Union at the time he was 
activating in Dresden), Vladimir Putin seemed that plunges into a crisis that could 
mean the end of his career. From this point the author undertakes an incursion in 
the road to power that Putin took, a road on which the current president of Russia 
intersected himself with many key figures of the public and political life. These 
include Anatoly Sobceak, who introduced Vladimir Putin on the political world 
stage, and Yeltsin family, its future protectors (the Yeltsin family was the factor 




that had helped him be appointed as director of FSB – the Federal Security Service 
- in 1998 and Secretary of the Security Council a year later) who had pushed him 
later on in the elections for the presidency of the Russian state. Also, the author 
presents Putin's relationship with Roman Abramovich, in a chapter called highly 
suggestive for the nuances of the rapprochement between the president and the 
businessman, In search of his brother - Roman Abramovich. 
At the same time, Belkovsky depicts from his own perspective Vladimir 
Putin's relations with the Russian oligarchs, among them Vladimir Gusinsky, Boris 
Berezovsky, Yevgeny Chichvarkin, Aleksander Lebedev. The author does not 
consider them enemies of the president, but pseudo-enemies, the finish of the 
chapter Putin and his enemies making a statement tinged with threat to Putin's 
opponents: Such pseudo-Putin virtual enemies are many. But Putin did not believe 
so. But even these pseudo-enemies would give anything if only a benevolent smile 
from the “opponent”, from the great statesman (p. 138). 
Chapter Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the favorite enemy presents details from 
behind the destruction of the career of the businessman mentioned above and his 
conviction to imprisonment for 13 years. Although he is presented as a moral 
symbol and bastion (not specifying against whom), the author states that the blame 
for the decline of the economic empire is Khodorkovsky himself, through the 
inability to manage political problems that he faced. 
If we are to believe those from Der Spiegel (and we find in this book 
sufficient reasons to do so) as that Stanislav Belkovsky is a close or at least a 
tolerated and encouraged author by the Russian secret services (p. 8), then we must 
see what his opinion about Russia's foreign policy during the presidency of Putin 
is. In opinion of Belkovsky, Putin's aim was and is the legalization in the West of 
both Russia and the Russian elite and himself. However, the author believes that, 
in its efforts, Vladimir Putin was not greeted by the Western world as they ought, 
even if he often showed leniency or courtesy (being the first who presented 
condolences to US and President Bush after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and 
opening to the Americans the airspace for transit). Moreover, Belkovsky does not 
hesitate to appoint Putin a pro-Western to whom the West so far has not acted 
accordingly to his actions. Thus, the deterioration of international relations 
between Russia and Western countries have led to - according to the author - the 
necessary replacement of (!) Dima [Dmitry] Medvedev with Putin at the 
presidential seat, because if something were to happen (...), Dima could not handle 





the situation (pp. 213-214). Such a statement makes us wonder about Belkovsky's 
perception on how the presidential position in Russia is obtained. 
The chapter Vladimir Putin: Imperfect crimes and perfect mistakes 
brings into discussion four issues: the existence of a dictatorship of the men with 
epaulettes, come mostly from the structures of the KGB, Vladimir Putin's 
involvement in political killings, the existence and operation of a real machinery of 
corruption in Putin's Russia and, finally, his desire to reunite the Soviet empire. 
Regarding the first point, after a brief analysis, Belkovsky concludes that it is 
difficult to determine the number of officials belonging to the Russian secret 
service, and that the existence of a militocracy can not be supported by sufficient 
grounds. According to the author, in Russia live many oligarchs controlling the 
most important functions of the state leadership. Regarding the involvement of 
Vladimir Putin in Aleksander Litvinenko or Anna Politkovskaya's assassinations, 
the author believes that the events mentioned above have caused more harm to the 
Russian president (of course, in the capital of the imagine) than it would have 
brought the disappearance of these characters. Thus the murder of Anna 
Politkovskaya is a result of a mafia-style execution of some Chechens for the 
disclosure made by the journalist of some people who wanted to overthrow the 
leader of the North Caucasus (Ramzan Kadyrov). Stanislav Belkovsky believes 
that the Russian President has nothing to do with Aleksander Litvinenko's death, 
the method that caused his death (poisoning with antediluvian polonium) is one 
that leaves some questions, given the traces left behind – intentionally, says the 
author – by this operation. Regarding the level of corruption in Russia, Belkovski 
does not blame the Russian President of any fault, considering that Boris Yeltsin 
was the ideologist and creator of the machinery of corruption nationwide. 
Moreover, the author depicts the image of a Vladimir Putin who could not stand to 
increase the level of corruption in the country, being perceived as a man who “was 
tricked by his honor” (p. 296). Finally, the last part of this chapter is reserved to 
the analysis of the Russia and Vladimir Putin’s attitude at the possibility of 
rebuilding the Soviet empire. Belkovsky says that it is hard to find a more anti-
Soviet state than the Russian Federation during Putin (p. 298), considering that 
Russia during Putin did not undertake any action to increase its influence on post-
Soviet countries. Omitting even the statement in which Putin said that the collapse 




of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the last century1, 
Belkovsky claims that during the current Russian president has been a decrease in 
quality of the Russian influence among members of CIS, relevant in this sense the 
“color revolutions” in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005 and 
2009). 
In front of a climbing of Aleksei Navalny in the political scene, the author 
declares himself extremely skeptical, considering him a person of perspective, but 
who is not recommended for the presidential office of Russia. Moreover, he 
compares him (calling him “temptation”) to Boris Yeltsin, who came as an 
alternative to Gorbachev's power, but who was a disappointment for the Russian 
people and its expectations. Also, he does not hesitate to assert that Russia does not 
need a new leader (p. 353). 
Finally, the last chapter (The collapse of the putinism economy - how 
and when will it be done?) debates the subject of the putinism economy that 
seems to sink into a crisis becoming more acute. After he is specifying the causes 
of this situation (not incriminating directly Putin), the author mentions the reasons 
for which the Russian citizens have to pay higher and higher charges (without 
Putin - allegedly - to could challenge these increases): the necessity of massive 
investments in the infrastructure which did not benefited from upgrades since 
during Brezhnev. The end of this chapter has mobilizing shades for the Russian 
people, serving very good Putin’s propaganda to show the West as an unreported 
enemy, who is just waiting to feast from the goods of Russian economy: But one 
thing is almost obvious: the resulting fragments from the collapse of the putinism 
economy will fill the whole Europe (p. 370). 
It should be noted that this volume, aside from its instigating and ironic 
character (here and there) gives us another image of Vladimir Putin, a character 
that the author just gives the impression that he is attacking, although he often calls 
him “our hero”, which wants to seem an irony that is not at all convincing. In fact, 
Belkovsky proposes the replacement of the myth of a brutal, harsh, vindictive 
Vladimir Putin, with the myth of a man who is often misunderstood and does 
nothing but to protect objectively the interests of the state that he leads. Putin is 
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seen by the Western world (and particularly by those who have not completed the 
work of Belkovsky) as aggressive, evil, dangerous, a KGB member, a former 
Soviet spy in East Germany, the moral coauthor of some heinous crimes 
(Aleksander Litvinenko, Anna Politkovskaya), the fierce warrior against 
Chechnya, the leader of an organization that comprises people from the secret 
services and military, Cossack nationalists, Stalinists etc. Seeing this, Stanislav 
Belkovsky aims the annihilation all of the negative epithets and replacing them 
with explanations of how the West (in error) perceived Putin in such a negative 
key. 
Often the author introduces passages with irrelevant information for the 
promised approach, that of drawing up a biography of Putin, information that can 
only get significance if we take into consideration Belkovsky's intention to 
manipulate the reader. Another element of disadvantage for this paper is the 
parsimony of documentary sources. The author does not hesitate to assert things 
full of weight, however he does not provide any document to prove those stated. 
On the same note, we must not lose sight of the perverse message sent 
through the Afterword of the paper, Why I request the Ukrainian citizenship, in 
which Belkovsky urges manifestly other Russians to request Ukrainian citizenship. 
In other words, the action that is intended as a form of protest against Putin's policy 
will give the latter a stronger theme for the annexation and domination under other 
forms of a part of Ukraine under the motivation of protecting a greater number of 
Russian citizens that the state should take care of. 
This paper seems to embody the description of the very structure of the 
governance system of Putin: a mixture of truths and myths, where the information 
and disinformation are forming an endless tandem, and the conspiracy theories 
abound and generates the idea that in this country where social segments are 
increasingly polarized (with rich oligarchs and a nostalgic and impoverished 
majority of the population), everything is possible. 
 
